- Greta Turnbull: "Divine Hiddenness as Higher Order Evidence"

Abstract: I argue that if we consider the problem of divine hiddenness as an evidential problem instead of a logical one, we should understand hiddenness as providing us with specifically higher order evidence. After clarifying the distinction between first and higher order evidence, I provide two reasons why we should consider hiddenness as higher order evidence: common assumptions about the effect hiddenness has on theistic belief, and the role of disagreement in the phenomenon of hiddenness. I then show that recognizing the problem of divine hiddenness as higher order evidence greatly complexifies our assessment of the problem's impact on the rationality of theistic belief.

- Laura Frances Callahan: "What to Expect From the God of History"

Abstract: I argue that our expectations for various evils conditional on theism ought to be informed by our empirical knowledge of history – that is, the history of what God, if God exists, has already allowed to happen. This point seems to have been often overlooked in the literature. And yet if I'm right, this entails that most particular evil events are not evidence against theism. This is a limited but important consequence in debates over the evidential impact of evil in general and, indeed, divine hiddenness. For our expectations for various particular instances of hiddenness ought also to be informed by our knowledge of past hiddenness.

- Jeffrey Russell: "Divine Hiddenness and Other Evidence."

Abstract: Many people do not know or believe there is a God, and many experience a sense of divine absence. Are these (and other) "divine hiddenness" facts evidence against the existence of God? Using Bayesian tools, we investigate evidential arguments from divine hiddenness, and respond to two objections to such arguments. The first objection says that the problem of hiddenness is just a special case of the problem of evil, and so if one has responded to the problem of evil then hiddenness has no additional bite. The second objection says that, while hiddenness may be evidence against generic theism, it is not evidence against more specific conceptions of God, and thus hiddenness poses no epistemic challenge to a theist who holds one of these more specific conceptions. Our investigation leaves open just how strong the evidence from hiddenness really is, but we aim to clear away some important reasons for thinking hiddenness is of no evidential significance at all.

- Matt Benton: "Interpersonal Hiddenness"

Abstract: A prominent family of arguments appeals to the "hiddenness" of God as a way of casting doubt on either the very existence of God, or on the assumptions underlying several theological expectations concerning a God of love. The first line of arguments attempt to derive divine non-existence from divine hiddenness. The second line of arguments appropriately arise within constructive theologizing or in the context of spiritual anxiety. This paper focuses on issues raised by that second line, and articulates a notion of interpersonal hiddenness. This sort of hiddenness holds import for the spiritual life of the religious believer, as well as for those (whether religious or not) frustrated by what they feel is God's obvious absence. Though this sort of interpersonal hiddenness has significant analogues in our interpersonal ways of relating to other human persons, its contours have been largely unexplored. Understanding such hiddenness promises to help us articulate different assumptions which philosophers, religious adherents, and religious skeptics make about what

kinds of experiences of God we are entitled to expect, and it sheds light on how each thinks about the "evidence" of religious (in)experience.

- Adam Green: "Getting the Priors Right: How Much Hiddenness Has There Been?"

Abstract: A Bayesian approach to divine hiddenness can help clarify what kinds of distribution of hiddenness phenomena would be problematic for belief in God (or a certain kind of God). It cannot, however, provide the distribution itself. That has to come from empirical data, conceptual argumentation, or intuition. This presentation will not itself seek to advance how we model hiddenness phenomena using Bayesian tools. Instead, I will seek to clarify what the phenomena are and what their distribution is and has been. This is important for any approach to hiddenness, but it has a special relevance to a Bayesian approach. In sum, I will argue, drawing on anthropology, the cognitive science of religion, and the like, that the distribution of belief in God across culture and time is inherently vague because one has to make a theoretically loaded decision about what kind of divine conception is close enough to count as non-hidden as well as what kind of cognitive, affective, or behavioral evidence counts as appropriate uptake of the divine so conceived. Nonetheless, comparing what a Bayesian approach yields based on different ways of stipulating the distribution of hiddenness phenomena still promises to be an illuminating element of a composite approach to hiddenness.